

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

The Security Situation in Uruguay

TOSeOJECRET

20 10 April 1967 No. 1056/67

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 10 April 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Security Situation in Uruguay
(Supplement to Situation Report Number 33
Information as of 4:00 p.m. EST)

- 1. No new information has been received that would change the basic conclusion reached in Special National Intelligence Estimate 98-67, SECURITY CONDITIONS IN URUGUAY, 23 March 1967. Nevertheless, Uruguayan security arrangements for the conference as a whole have not developed as smoothly as we had hoped; this increases the possibility that the Communists or isolated terrorist groups would be able to create disorders which could disrupt the conference or embarrass its participants. Personal risk to President Johnson still appears to be slight. We emphasize that we have not identified any new or more serious threat. It is simply that weaknesses on the part of Uruguayan security forces leave a greater opening for disruptive activity.
- 2. The responsibility for the security of the zone surrounding the San Rafael Hotel has been returned from the army to the police, as originally planned, and there are about 500 men on duty there. Army troops have been provided to assist in the patrolling of the outer periphery of the hotel area. The police at the front entrance are specially trained in crowd handling and riot control.

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5. The Surinamese security forces (about 1,100 Dutch troops) should be capable of providing adequate protection at Zanderij airport, which is 20 miles south of Paramaribo. The only leftist party, the Nationalist Republic Party, is small and ineffective. It probably could not mount a successful anti-US demonstration. Surinamese are generally pro-US, and it is unlikely that any significant anti-US, anti-summit activities will be attempted in Surinam.

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